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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal, the primary issue is whether US W ATS 
improperly denied Mark Scully the right to exer cise his 
stock option following his wrongful ter mination, and, if so, 
whether the District Court, in awarding damages, 
improperly failed to apply a discount fr om market value 
to account for the option shares' lack of marketability. 
In May 1995, US WATS, Inc., a Pennsylvania based 
telecommunications carrier, hired Mark Scully as president 
and chief operations officer for a two-year period to 
implement a financial turnaround of the company. As part 
of Scully's compensation, US WATS of fered him an option 
for a substantial amount of restricted shar es which US 
WATS viewed as exercisable only so long as Scully remained 
employed by the company. The shares wer e restricted 
because they could not be transferred for up to one year of 
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the date of their purchase. Although Scully achieved some 
success in making US WATS profitable, the company 
terminated him before the end of his two-year employment 
period and before he could exercise his stock option. 
 
Scully sued US WATS, as well as thr ee of its former 
officers and directors, Stephen Parker , Aaron Brown, and 
Kevin O'Hare for breach of contract, conspiracy, fraudulent 
and negligent misrepresentation and violation of 
Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law ("WPCL"). 
 
After a two-day bench trial, the District Court determined 
that (1) US WATS had wrongfully terminated Scully in 
violation of a two-year employment contract; (2) US WATS 
wrongfully deprived Scully of his stock option; (3) Parker 
and Brown were individually liable under theories of 
conspiracy or "alter ego"; (4) O'Har e was not liable on any 
claim; and (5) Scully was not entitled to attor ney's fees and 
liquidated damages under Pennsylvania law. Based on 
these findings, the District Court awarded Scully damages 
in the sum of $626,442, which represented the value of 
Scully's stock option, lost wages, and inter est. The parties 
cross-appeal. 
 
After careful consideration of the numer ous issues on 
appeal, we will affirm the District Court's conclusion that 
US WATS unlawfully discharged Scully. We will also affirm 
the determination that US WATS wr ongfully deprived Scully 
of his stock option and the District Court's damages 
valuation method. However, we will reverse the judgments 
entered against Parker and Brown because the evidence 
does not support their individual liability for the actions of 
the company. Lastly, because we conclude that under state 
law US WATS's conduct entitles Scully to attorney's fees 
and may entitle him to liquidated damages, we will r emand 
this issue to the District Court for further pr oceedings. 
 
I. 
 
In October 1994 Mark Scully entered into a six-month 
oral consulting agreement with US WA TS, a 
telecommunications company with a principal office in Bala 
Cynwyd, Pennsylvania. Scully had been hired by 
defendants Parker and Brown, who founded US W ATS in 
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1989, to achieve a financial turnaround of their company. 
Scully's consulting services proved so beneficial to US 
WATS that, in May 1995, Parker and Br own offered him a 
written contract to serve a two-year term of employment as 
president and chief operating officer . He declined the 
written contract, and instead, according to Scully, entered 
into an oral employment agreement with the company for a 
similar two-year term. 
 
As an inducement for Scully to remain the full two years, 
US WATS granted him an option to pur chase 850,000 
shares of restricted stock that would vest over a two year 
period. The option was granted pursuant to a written 1993 
Executive Stock Option Agreement ("the Stock Option 
Agreement"), which was governed by US WATS's 1993 
Executive Stock Option Plan ("the Stock Option Plan"). 
When US WATS hired Scully in May 1995, the Stock Option 
Plan provided that all options would extinguish upon 
termination of employment. However, during Scully's term 
as president, the Stock Option Plan was amended by a 
1996 Executive Stock Option Plan to provide that employee 
options would extinguish 30 days after termination from 
the company. 
 
Notwithstanding Scully's apparent success in turning US 
WATS into a profitable company, in December 1996, 
approximately eighteen months after he began as president, 
Parker and Brown replaced Scully with Kevin O'Hare. The 
District Court found that, although Scully would no longer 
be president, O'Hare, Parker, and Brown promised him 
"that his continued employment until May 1997 was 
assured." Scully v. U.S. WA TS, Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-4051, 
1999 WL 553474, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1999). However, 
on December 30, 1996, Scully was terminated without 
warning, effective immediately. 
 
On January 23, 1997, Scully attempted to exer cise his 
option to purchase 600,000 shares that had vested by that 
date. US WATS refused to honor the option. Instead, the 
company claimed that since Scully had been fir ed, his stock 
option automatically expired. As a result, Scully filed suit 
against US WATS, Parker, Br own, and O'Hare. Following 
the trial, the District Court determined that Scully and US 
WATS had entered into a valid two year employment 
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contract and that "the defendants had no just cause for 
terminating [Scully's] employment." Id. The Court set forth 
the reasons for that termination as follows: 
 
       The real reason for the defendants' actions, or at least 
       a principal reason, lay in the fact that the corporation, 
       which was entirely controlled by Messrs. Brown and 
       Parker, had granted more stock options than it could 
       possibly fulfill; and, unless some of the outstanding 
       stock options could be eliminated before December 31, 
       1996, accurate filings with the SEC would r eveal the 
       true state of the corporation's affairs. Plaintiff 's options 
       to purchase 600,000 of the 850,000 shar es had 
       already vested; and in view of plaintif f 's forthcoming 
       termination in May 1997, and in view of defendants' 
       knowledge that plaintiff would be receiving a 
       substantial sum of money from another investment in 
       January 1997, and would therefore be likely to exercise 
       his options, (which were definitely "in the money") the 
       defendants Brown and Parker carried out their plan to 
       (1) replace plaintiff before the end of 1996, (2) persuade 
       him that he would remain in the company's employ 
       through May 1997, and would therefor e see no need to 
       take immediate action with respect to exer cising his 
       options, and (3) fire him as of December 30, 1996, 
       without advance notice, so that he would be unable to 
       exercise his options before the ter mination of his 
       employment. 
 
Id. 
 
During the trial, the parties presented expert testimony 
to establish the value of the restricted shar es that US 
WATS refused to deliver. Following the evidence, the Court 
opined that "[r]estricted shares ar e generally regarded as 
subject to a discount from market price, because of the 
restriction." Scully v. US WA TS, Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-4051, 
1999 WL 391495, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 1999). On this 
basis, the Court concluded that the appropriate discount 
would be 30%. Despite this initial observation, the Court 
ultimately chose not to apply a discount, and instead, 
based its damage award on the differ ence between the 
exercise price of the option and the price of unrestricted 
shares as of the date of the breach. The Court therefore 
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awarded Scully $595,000 in compensatory damages for US 
WATS's failure to deliver the shar es and $31,442 for lost 
wages. The District Court's jurisdiction was based upon 
diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C.S 1332(a). We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
We first address the issue of whether US WATS and 
Scully had entered into a two-year employment contract. 
US WATS argues that the District Court's conclusion that 
there was an oral employment contract is (1) based on 
insufficient evidence, and (2) contrary to Pennsylvania's 
presumption of at-will employment. This issue sets forth a 
mixed question of fact and law. To the extent the issue 
presented concerns narrative facts, r eview is for clear error. 
We extend plenary review to whether the District Court 
correctly applied the standard for over coming 
Pennsylvania's presumption in favor of at-will employment. 
See Ram Constr. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 
1049, 1052-53 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
Pennsylvania presumes all employment to be at-will. See, 
e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 176 
(Pa. 1974); Scullion v. Emeco Indus., Inc., 580 A.2d 1356, 
1358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). This presumption is necessary 
to prevent baseless assertions of oral employment contracts 
for a definite term. See Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 
A.2d 1192, 1198 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). However, it is 
merely a presumption, and courts must be careful in 
protecting a litigant's right to prove that the parties 
intended a specific employment period. See id.  The party 
attempting to overcome the presumption must show clear 
and precise evidence of an oral employment contract for a 
definite term. See Gorwara v. AEL Indus., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 
239, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Adams v. Budd Co., 583 F. Supp. 
711, 713 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Oliver Realty, 526 A.2d at 1202. 
Evidence of a subjective expectation of a guaranteed 
employment period, based on employer practices or vague 
employer superlatives, is insufficient. See Adams, 583 F. 
Supp. at 713-14; Ross v. Montour R.R. Co., 516 A.2d 29, 32 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). 
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Based on the evidence presented, the District Court 
concluded that Scully and US WATS had entered into a 
two-year oral employment contract. Scully testified that 
when he and US WATS entered into the original 
employment contract, they discussed detailed ter ms of the 
agreement, or "deal points," including Scully obtaining 
(1) the same salary as Brown; (2) a car and an apartment at 
company expense; and (3) the option to pur chase 850,000 
shares of stock that would vest over two years. Brown 
admitted that he had discussed these deal points with 
Scully. The District Court concluded as follows: 
 
       I accept plaintiff 's testimony on this subject as entirely 
       credible. Both Brown and Parker admitted (1) that they 
       very much wanted plaintiff to stay with the company 
       for two years; (2) plaintiff agreed to stay for two years; 
       (3) they offered plaintiff a written contract for two 
       years, but plaintiff did not feel a written contract was 
       necessary; and (4) the stock options, which admittedly 
       were a key component of the transaction so far as 
       plaintiff was concerned, were exer cisable over a two- 
       year period. The company's stock option plan which 
       was then in effect specified that such options could be 
       exercised only during the continuation of employment 
       by the company; hence, it is quite clear that all 
       concerned contemplated that plaintiff would remain in 
       the company's employ for a two-year period. 
 
Scully, 1999 WL 391495, at *2. The District Court further 
concluded that: 
 
       both sides had agreed on a two-year ter m of 
       employment. [US WATS] . . . undoubtedly wanted 
       [Scully] to stay for two years, and contemplated that he 
       would do so. [Scully] did not refuse to agree to a two- 
       year term, he simply stated that a written contract was 
       not necessary. 
 
Scully, 1999 WL 553474, at *2. 
 
Because the record supports the District Court's factual 
findings, we cannot say that the Court clearly err ed.1 As we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court found in the alternative that the parties entered 
into an oral employment contract, for a period of six months, on 
December 18, 1996. However, as we have alr eady determined that there 
is sufficient evidence to support the District Court's finding that a two- 
year oral employment contract existed, we need not address this issue. 
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have recognized, the clearly erroneous standard of review 
"does not permit an appellate court to substitute its 
findings for those of the trial court. It allows only an 
assessment of whether there is enough evidence on the 
record to support those findings. That a different set of 
inferences could be drawn from the r ecord is not 
determinative. It is sufficient that the District Court 
findings of fact could be reasonably inferr ed from the entire 
trial record." Knop v. McMahan, 872 F.2d 1132, 1141 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in 
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 676 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
"Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly 
erroneous." United States v. Pelullo, 173 F.3d 131, 135 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 824 (1999). 
 
In this case, the District Court based its deter mination 
on the testimony of Scully, US WATS's principals, and the 
surrounding circumstances. The Court had an opportunity 
to observe the demeanor and appearance of the witnesses 
as they testified and to evaluate their believability. In this 
regard, we observe that "[t]he cr edibility of witnesses is 
quintessentially the province of the trial court, not the 
appellate court. `Credibility determinations are the unique 
province of a fact finder, be it a jury, or a judge sitting 
without a jury.' Accordingly, we may only r eject a District 
Court's finding concerning a witness's cr edibility in rare 
circumstances." Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125, 140 
(3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 
177 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1079 (1999)) 
(other citations omitted). 
 
Here, the District Court acted within its factfinding 
authority in determining that US WA TS intended to be 
bound for a definite employment term. See Scullion, 580 
A.2d at 1358-59; Marsh v. Boyle, 530 A.2d 491, 494-95 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1987). We therefor e agree with the Court's 
conclusion that Scully and US WATS orally consented to a 
two-year term of employment, and that Scully properly 
overcame Pennsylvania's presumption of at-will 
employment. 
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III. 
 
The more difficult issues in this case r elate to Scully's 
attempted exercise of his stock option and the question of 
damages. Initially, US WATS contends that the District 
Court erred in determining that it br eached a contractual 
duty when it refused to honor Scully's attempt to exercise 
his option. In its memorandum opinion, the District Court 
concluded that "plaintiff 's attempted exercise of his stock 
options on January [23], 1997 was timely and appropriate, 
and that the defendants wrongfully refused to comply." 
Scully, 1999 WL 391495, at *3. The Court elaborated on its 
reasoning as follows: 
 
        Plaintiff 's options were issued originally in 
       accordance with the 1993 stock option plan adopted by 
       the company. Under the terms of that plan, stock 
       options could be exercised only during continued 
       employment. But, since plaintiff 's employment was 
       wrongfully terminated--i.e., since he had a contractual 
       right to continue to be employed on January [23], 1997 
       --the defendants' breach of that employment contract 
       cannot entitle the defendants to cancel the stock 
       options which were an essential part of that contract of 
       employment. 
 
Id. 
 
We perceive no error. The District Court correctly 
reasoned that US WATS could not justify rejecting Scully's 
January 1997 attempt to exercise his stock option by 
invoking his December 1996 termination fr om employment 
because Scully's discharge was based on US W ATS's 
wrongful breach of its employment contract. See Greene v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 1237, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 
2000) (wrongfully discharged executive entitled to damages 
for unrealized stock option appreciation); Knox v. Microsoft 
Corp., 962 P.2d 839, 841-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) 
(employee wrongly terminated in br each of employment 
contract entitled to damages for cancellation of unvested 
stock option), review denied, 980 P .2d 1280 (Wash. 1999). 
 
IV. 
 
Having determined that US WATS's wrongful termination 
improperly denied Scully the right to exer cise his stock 
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option, we turn to whether the District Court properly 
valued the stock option in awarding damages. The Stock 
Option Agreement provides that it is to be interpreted 
primarily under federal law, and secondarily by New York 
state law. The parties, however, agree that the applicable 
law is the same regardless of whether federal, New York, or 
Pennsylvania law is applied. Therefore, we draw widely from 
the law in these jurisdictions, as well as other analogous 
decisions. Our standard of review is plenary because 
whether the District Court applied the appropriate measure 
of contract damages is a question of law. W illiam B. Tanner 
Co. v. WIOO, Inc., 528 F.2d 262, 271 (3d Cir. 1975). After 
careful consideration of the parties' contrasting approaches, 
we will affirm the District Court's damage calculation. 
 
We begin our analysis with a brief explanation of 
executive stock options. 
 
        An executive stock option is a contract between two 
       parties which provides the option purchaser (the 
       executive) the right, but not the obligation, to acquire 
       a firm's common stock at an agreedfixed price for a 
       specified amount of time. 
 
Les Barenbaum, Ph.D. & Walt Schubert, Ph.D., Measuring 
the Value of Executive Stock Options, 12 No. 12 Fair$hare 3, 
3 (December 1992) [hereinafter Measuring the Value]. As 
observed by commentators, judicial adjudication of stock 
option controversies is becoming more common due to the 
widespread use of options as incentives and bonuses. 
 
       Stock options ("call options") allow an employee to buy 
       the employer's stock at a specified future date at a 
       price (the "strike price" [or "exer cise price"]) fixed on 
       the date that the stock is granted. Stock options ar e 
       granted with the expectation that the stock will 
       increase in price during the intervening period, thus 
       allowing the grantee the right to buy the stock 
       significantly below its market price. Traditionally the 
       preserve of corporate executives, stock options are now 
       becoming more widely available to employees 
       throughout a corporation, and may be given as a long- 
       term bonus or incentive, often not vesting for several 
       years into the future. 
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        Stock options have become prominent over the past 
       decade, as many Internet "start up" companies 
       typically offer to their employees and applicants the 
       prospect of potentially lucrative stock options in order 
       to recruit and maintain their workforce. Stock options 
       are not only an "incentive" or rewar d to high-ranking or 
       high-performing employees, but also a form of deferred 
       compensation. Indeed, many start-up companies 
       dangle the prospect of lucrative stock options--that 
       can be exercised when the company "goes public"--in 
       order to entice job applicants to join a new company 
       with an unproven track record. Employees who are 
       terminated or constructively discharged usually forfeit 
       their ability to participate in their employer's stock 
       option plans, and may therefore seek judicial relief. 
 
Lynne Bernabei & Alan R. Kabat, Stock Options and 
Employment Discrimination Law, in 2 Nat'l Employment 
Lawyers Ass'n, 2000 Eleventh Annual Convention Course 
Manual at 709-10 (June 21-24, 2000). The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has further observed: 
 
       The conferring of options on an executive cr eates an 
       incentive for the executive to work hard to increase the 
       market price of the employer's stock because that 
       increases the value of the executive's stock options. 
       Stock options are an increasingly common form of 
       executive compensation. Options are often conferred in 
       the place of more traditional forms of compensation 
       like salary . . . . 
 
Safeway Stores, 210 F.3d at 1243 (citing Susan J. Stabile, 
Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based 
Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Per formance?, 2 
U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 227 (1999)). 
 
Initially, we note that valuing employee stock options is 
a complicated enterprise, made more so because, unlike 
other stock options, employee stock options ar e not publicly 
traded. Cf. Everett v. Everett, 489 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1992) (noting that calculating "the value of stock 
options[ ] [is] a formidable task given the numerous possible 
contingencies and restrictions involving stock options"). 
This is exemplified by the stock option damage calculations 
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presented here, which span the terrain between $180,625 
as proposed by US WATS, $531,250 in the District Court's 
opinion, and $1,078,125 according to Scully. 
 
In this case, the Stock Option Agreement granted Scully 
the right to purchase 850,000 shares of r estricted stock at 
$0.75 per share. The restriction pr ovided that, upon 
exercising the option, Scully would not be able to transfer 
the stock for a one-year period from the date of the 
exercise. At the time of his termination in December 1996, 
Scully's option had vested as to 600,000 shar es. On 
January 23, 1997, when Scully attempted to exer cise his 
option for those 600,000 shares, US WA TS's publicly traded 
stock closed at $1.375 per share. The option to purchase 
the remaining 250,000 shares vested just over three 
months later, on May 1, 1997. 
 
The District Court measured damages as of January 23, 
1997, the date it determined US WA TS refused to allow 
Scully to exercise his option. The Court calculated the 
damages based on the difference between Scully's exercise 
price (purchase price) of $0.75 per shar e and the $1.375 
market price of unrestricted US WA TS stock on that day, or 
$0.625 per share. The Court applied that calculation to the 
total 850,000 shares obtainable under the Stock Option 
Agreement, rather than only to the 600,000 that had vested 
by January 23, 1997, reasoning that absent his wrongful 
termination, Scully would have fully exer cised his option 
after all shares had vested. This method yielded an award 
of $531,250 ($0.625 x 850,000 shares), plus interest. 
 
Both parties take issue with the District Court's damage 
calculation. Scully contends that the District Court erred in 
calculating his damages by reference to the breach of 
contract date. Scully argues that, instead, his damages 
should have been calculated as of the end of the r estricted 
periods because only then could he have sold all the 
shares. Applying that calculation would benefit him 
because US WATS's stock increased significantly in value 
over the relevant time periods. For instance, on January 
23, 1998, when the restricted period expir ed for the 
600,000 shares Scully would have obtained thr ough his 
exercise one year earlier, US WA TS's stock closed at $2.00 
per share. Had Scully sold the stock on that date, he would 
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have realized a profit of $1.25 per shar e ($2.00 - $0.75). 
Thus, Scully seeks damages relating to those 600,000 
shares in the sum of $750,000 ($1.25 x 600,000 shares). 
Scully's remaining option for 250,000 shar es of stock did 
not vest until May 1, 1997. Scully asserts that he could 
have exercised that option on May 24, 1997, the day after 
his two-year oral contract of employment expir ed. Scully's 
first opportunity to have sold that stock would have been 
on the first business day after the applicable one-year 
restricted period expired, which would have been May 26, 
1998. On that day, US WATS's stock closed at $2.0625. 
Had Scully sold his last 250,000 shares then, he would 
have realized a profit of $1.3125 per share ($2.0625 - 
$.075). Thus, with respect to the 250,000 shar es, Scully 
claims damages of $328,125 ($1.3125 x 250,000 shar es). 
Accordingly, Scully's total damage claim r elated to US 
WATS's refusal to honor his stock option is $1,078,125 
($750,000 + $328,125), plus interest. 
 
By contrast, US WATS argues that, while the District 
Court's valuation date was proper, the court incorrectly 
valued the option by failing to apply a discount fr om fair 
market value, which was necessary to account for the 
restricted shares' lack of marketability. See Simon v. 
Electrospace Corp., 269 N.E.2d 21, 27 (N.Y. 1971) (noting 
that plaintiff 's damages would be subject to a discount if 
he were entitled to restricted shar es, as opposed to shares 
that were "freely salable"). In other words, US WATS 
emphasizes that what Scully lost was an opportunity to 
obtain less valuable, restricted shares, not more valuable, 
freely tradable shares. Consequently, US W ATS submits 
that, since the District Court additionally found that the 
restrictions on marketability would render the restricted 
stock 30% less valuable, Scully's actual loss fr om the non- 
delivery of the stock was $180,625. US WA TS calculates 
this sum by taking the $1.375 market price of unr estricted 
stock on January 23, 1997 and applying the 30% discount, 
for a hypothetical market price of $0.9625 for r estricted US 
WATS stock. According to US W ATS, Scully lost the 
difference between the hypothetical market price of US 
WATS restricted stock and his option exercise price, or 
$0.2125 per share ($0.9625 - $0.75). Since the District 
Court correctly assessed liability under a br each of 
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employment contract, pursuant to which Scully was 
deprived of his ability to purchase all 850,000 shares of 
restricted stock, US WATS's damage theory would result in 
an award of $180,625 ($0.2125 x 850,000 shar es), plus 
interest. 
 
The District Court rejected both of these appr oaches. The 
Court considered Scully's position unacceptable because it 
gave him the benefit of hindsight, thereby putting him in a 
better position than if the breach in employment contract 
had never occurred. This is so because the period between 
the breach and the District Court's adjudication revealed to 
Scully precisely when the market prices of US W ATS stock 
were at their highest. By the same token, the Court was 
unwilling to adopt US WATS's position because it deprived 
Scully of the important advantage he enjoyed pursuant to 
the option, namely the prospect of reaping a significant 
profit should the value of the stock rise. The Court 
considered this result unacceptable because it would 
essentially reward US WATS for its breach of contract. 
Moreover, although the Court noted that after the breach 
Scully could have "covered" by pur chasing the same 
number of unrestricted stocks on the open market as to 
which he held an option, he would have had to risk a much 
larger amount of money, given that on January 23, 1997 
the market price for unrestricted US WA TS stock ($1.375) 
was significantly higher than his option exer cise price 
($0.75) for restricted US WATS stock. 
 
In resolving this issue, we concentrate on two competing 
damages theories upon which the parties have focused: 
(1) conversion, and (2) breach of contract. Under the 
conversion theory, damages are intended to compensate a 
plaintiff for actual loss. Schultz v. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n, 716 F.2d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1983); see also 
Galigher v. Jones, 129 U.S. 193, 200-01 (1889). As 
presently conceived, conversion damages ar e based on lost 
profits, which are computed by comparing the plaintiff 's 
exercise price to (1) the value of the stock at the time of 
conversion, or (2) the highest intermediate stock price 
between the notice of conversion and a reasonable time 
thereafter during which the stock could have been replaced, 
or whichever is greater. See Schultz , 716 F.2d at 141. 
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Courts have often used this loss theory in cases involving 
stock because it is particularly germane to goods having 
fluctuating market values. See id. at 139-40; Clements v. 
Mueller, 41 F.2d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1930). 
 
Stocks have also been valued pursuant to a br each of 
contract theory under which the goal is to put the plaintiff 
in the same position he would have held had the br each 
never occurred. Under this approach, the court calculates 
damages as of the date of the breach. "The proper measure 
of damages for breach of contract is deter mined by the loss 
sustained or gain prevented at the time and place of 
breach. The rule is precisely the same when the breach of 
contract is nondelivery of shares of stock." Electrospace, 
269 N.E.2d at 26 (citations omitted); accor d Indu Craft, Inc. 
v. Bank of Baroda, 47 F.3d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1995); Buford 
v. Wilmington Trust Co., 841 F .2d 51, 55-56 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Under the contract theory, damages are calculated by 
taking the difference between a stock option's exercise price 
and the market price of the same stock at the time of 
breach. See Hermanowski v. Acton Corp., 580 F. Supp. 140, 
146 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff 'd in relevant part, 729 F.2d 921 
(2d Cir. 1984). This measurement pr oduces the option's 
"intrinsic value," which is the differ ence between an 
option's exercise price and the market price for the same 
stock. See Measuring the Value, at 3. 
 
Both the conversion and contract theories pr esume that 
a plaintiff has the ability to "cover ," in other words, mitigate 
damages by protecting prospective pr ofit, by entering the 
market to purchase the lost shares. However, the theories 
differ markedly as to when that ability to cover is relevant. 
The conversion theory extends the cover date to a 
"reasonable time" into the future, and therefore allows a 
plaintiff to recover from the defendant some prospective 
profit that may have accrued after the wr ongful act. In 
contrast, the contract theory, as most strictly employed in 
the stock context, puts the onus on a plaintif f to cover 
immediately upon the breach because damages ar e fixed as 
of the breach date. Therefore, in the stock context, the 
contract theory does not allow a plaintiff to recover any 
prospective profit from the defendant. 
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These differences give each damage theory divergent 
strengths and weaknesses. The conversion theory allows a 
plaintiff to recover, to a limited extent, a relevant benefit of 
his bargain, namely the prospect of futur e profits which 
provide the fundamental underpinning to stock options. In 
this respect, it is an attractive alter native because it does 
not "reward" a defendant for its wr ongful conduct. However, 
this advantage comes at the price of injecting uncertainty 
into the damage calculation by, for example, r equiring 
speculation as to the expiration of a reasonable time by 
which the plaintiff should have covered. Cf. Schultz, 716 
F.2d at 140 ("what constitutes a r easonable period between 
the act complained of and the time when reentry into the 
market would be both warranted and possible will vary 
from case to case"). Moreover, the extended cover period 
may give a plaintiff the improper benefit of hindsight. See 
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 838 F.2d 904, 907 
(7th Cir. 1988) (conversion theory "is a generous--maybe 
too generous--measure of damages; it assumes that the 
customer would have had the clairvoyance to sell when the 
stock hit its peak during the relevant period, and by so 
assuming systematically overcompensates defrauded 
investors"). 
 
By comparison, the contract theory will likely lead to a 
more scrupulous damage calculation because it avoids any 
uncertainty concerning the amount of futur e profit or 
future loss. However, this advantage is achieved at the cost 
of distorting the damage calculation because it fails to 
consider the benefit the plaintiff held pursuant to his 
option, namely a reduced risk of loss and a gr eater 
likelihood of profit. This is because the contract theory 
measures damages by reference to the lost option's intrinsic 
value. As a general rule, the intrinsic value of an option is 
lower than its true value, the hypothetical price at which 
the option would be traded on an open market. "A common 
misconception in the valuation of executive stock options is 
that option value is best represented by its intrinsic value." 
Measuring the Value, at 3-4. The intrinsic value generally 
fails to reflect the true value because an option holder can, 
within contractual constraints, wait to exer cise his option 
until the market price for the stock exceeds the exercise 
price. The holder is thereby able to (1) decrease his risk of 
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incurring a loss, and (2) increase his likelihood of obtaining 
a future profit. "Options generally sell for more than their 
intrinsic value because they offer an investor the 
opportunity to earn large gains if the underlying security 
goes up in price while, because the option need not be 
exercised should the underlying security value fall, losses 
are limited to the cost of the option." Measuring the Value, 
at 3-4. Thus, the contract theory fails to r ecognize that, 
even when an option has an intrinsic value of zer o, its true 
market value will be positive so long as the stock's value 
has the potential to increase. As an example, under a strict 
breach of contract approach, where an option's intrinsic 
value is zero, the plaintiff 's damages will also be zero even 
though the plaintiff 's lost option may have a positive value. 
Against this backdrop, it can be said that the contract 
theory arguably "rewards" a defendant for its breach 
because, as in this case, it does not compensate the 
plaintiff for all the benefits he lost when denied the option. 
 
Courts have not taken a consistent approach in 
computing damages concerning the loss of securities or 
stock options. For example, several breach of contract cases 
have measured damages based on the lost option's intrinsic 
value. See, e.g., Hermanowski, 729 F.2d at 922, aff 'g 580 
F. Supp. at 146; Rosen v. Duggan's Distillers Prods. Corp., 
256 N.Y.S.2d 950, 951 (App. Div. 1965); see 
also Richardson v. Richardson , 659 S.W.2d 510, 512-13 
(Ark. 1983) (in divorce proceeding necessitating division of 
property, stock option valued according to intrinsic value). 
 
Other breach of contract cases, however , have avoided 
the standard contract damage computation. For instance, 
in one recent decision involving stocks, a District Court 
held that the failure to honor a contract for the delivery of 
warrants, which are analogous to stock options, presented 
a breach of contract claim rather than a conversion. 
Commonwealth Assocs. v. Palomar Med. Techs., Inc., 982 F. 
Supp. 205, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Nevertheless, the Court 
awarded damages based on a calculation that was more 
akin to the conversion model, determining the plaintiff 's 
lost profit by reference to a pr ospective sale of the stock 
that the plaintiff should have been able to ef fectuate, had 
the defendant not breached the contract. Id. at 209, 212. 
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Clearly, this was not a strict breach of contract damage 
computation, which would have limited damages to those 
calculable on the earlier breach date.2 In another decision 
which has blurred the distinction between br each of 
contract and conversion damage theories, the Court held as 
follows: 
 
       "[T]he measure of damages for the failur e to sell or to 
       deliver stocks and like speculative property, or for the 
       conversion thereof, is the highest market value which 
       the property attains between the time when the 
       contract required its sale or delivery, or the time of its 
       conversion, and the expiration of a reasonable time, to 
       enable the owner to put himself in statu quo, after 
       notice to him of the failure to comply with the contract, 
       or of the conversion." 
 
Clements, 41 F.2d at 42 (quoting McKinley v. Williams, 74 
F. 94, 102 (8th Cir. 1896)); see also Schultz, 716 F.2d at 
141 (noting in dicta that "[m]any cases" have followed the 
conversion model "where stock . . . wer e converted, [or] not 
delivered according to contractual or other legal obligation") 
(citation omitted); Rauser v. LTV Electr osystems, Inc., 437 
F.2d 800, 803-05 (7th Cir. 1971) (in suit brought against 
former employer for failure to deliver stock option, in which 
plaintiff asserted breach of stock option agreement, 
damages calculated using conversion model). 
 
Depending on the circumstances of the case, the blurring 
between conversion and breach of contract r emedies may 
be justified. As explained above, the conversion theory 
allows a plaintiff, who was wrongly denied a stock option, 
a limited recovery for his lost opportunity to enjoy a 
reduced risk of loss and a greater likelihood of profit. 
Because that opportunity constituted part of the benefit of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. US WATS argues that Palomar offers no support for Scully's position 
because damages there were calculated as of the date of the breach. 
That is incorrect. The Palomar Court determined that the breach date 
occurred in March 1996. Palomar, 982 F. Supp. at 211 ("the relevant 
breach occurred when defendant failed to honor plaintiff 's request for 
registration and issuance of the shares in March 1996"). Nonetheless, 
the Court calculated damages by reference to a June 1996 stock sale 
that the plaintiff had intended. Id. at 209, 212. 
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his bargain, providing a remedy for that loss is consistent 
with a goal of damage awards in the breach of contract 
setting. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 344(a) 
(1981) ("Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this 
Restatement serve to protect . . . a pr omisee[`s] . . . 
`expectation interest,' which is his inter est in having the 
benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as 
he would have been in had the contract been per formed"); 
22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages S 43(a) (1988) (same). 
 
Indeed, given the myriad factors that might arise in each 
case, we doubt that any single universal damage theory 
could properly value stock options in all situations. 
Consequently, we agree with the District Court's damage 
calculation because it properly weighed and balanced the 
strengths and weaknesses of competing damage calculation 
methods to achieve the requisite end of putting Scully in 
the position most closely reflecting the one he would have 
held absent US WATS's breach. 
 
In this case, the District Court adhered to the general 
breach of contract rule by calculating damages as of the 
date of breach. The Court's decision is consistent with the 
view that a failure to deliver securities or stock options, 
pursuant to a legally binding agreement, constitutes a 
breach of contract. See Palomar, 982 F . Supp. at 211; 
Hermanowski, 580 F. Supp. at 145; Electrospace, 269 
N.E.2d at 26; see also Buford, 841 F .2d at 55-56; Knox, 962 
P.2d at 841 (approving application of general contract 
principles to wrongful termination claim brought by former 
employee seeking damages for lost stock option). 
 
Further, by relying on the breach date, and thereby 
measuring damages as of the one date in the r ecord when 
Scully was clearly willing to risk capital, the District Court 
avoided the speculativeness and hindsight pr oblems 
attendant to the conversion theory. Thus, we r eject Scully's 
argument that the District Court should have measured his 
damages as of the expiration of the restricted holding 
periods. Not only is his approach contrary to the general 
rule that damages for a breach of contract ar e determined 
on the breach date, it is unduly speculative because it 
presumes that the shares would be sold immediately at the 
end of the restricted period, which further pr esumes that 
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the stock will have the same or a higher value on the first 
date it can be sold as compared to the price at which it was 
bought. Therefore, in the absence of a district court's 
express credibility finding or other convincing evidence, we 
cannot accept a plaintiff 's after-the-fact assertion that he 
would have sold stock at a time that, in hindsight, would 
have been particularly advantageous.3 Were Scully's 
approach accepted, he would receive mor e than the benefit 
of his bargain because the stock option mer ely (1) reduced 
his risk of incurring a loss, and (2) incr eased the likelihood 
that he would reap a profit. However , the stock option 
neither extinguished all risk, nor guaranteed a pr ofit. 
 
In addition, Scully's assertion that damages should be 
calculated as of the end of the restricted period would be 
particularly problematic in cases where the restricted 
period ended after trial. Such a problem could occur with 
a five- or perhaps even a two-year r estriction period. This 
problem intensifies as the end of the r estricted period 
moves farther into the future because the vagaries of the 
stock market render valuation of the security interest more 
speculative. 
 
Just as we approve the District's Court's use of the 
breach date for calculating damages, we also approve of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court's ruling expressed an unwillingness to simply 
accept Scully's position concerning the dates he would have sold the 
shares had US WATS delivered them. Moreover, this is not a case where 
adequate evidence confirmed a plaintif f 's professed intent concerning 
the exercise of security interests. Cf. Safeway Stores, 210 F.3d at 1243 
(plaintiff 's assertion that he would have exercised stock option later 
than 
his wrongful termination forced him to, which would have significantly 
increased his profit, confirmed by his planned retirement date); Kers & 
Co. v. ATC Communications Group, Inc. , 9 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1271 (D. 
Kan. 1998) (partnership's contention that, absent defendant's wrongful 
conduct, it would have sold shares during significantly profitable time 
frame confirmed by evidence that its trustees, before benefitting from 
hindsight, had "explicitly agreed" to sell stock at first opportunity); 
Palomar, 982 F. Supp. at 207, 209 (fir m's assertion, which benefitted 
from hindsight, that it would have sold stock during a particularly 
advantageous period was confirmed by thefirm's demonstrable need at 
the time to quickly raise cash in order to satisfy two impending financial 
obligations). 
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District Court's valuation method because both of these 
aspects of the District Court's formula wer e designed to put 
Scully in the position most closely reflecting the one he 
would have held absent US WATS's br each of contract. See 
Knox, 962 P.2d at 841 (damages in a wr ongful termination 
case are intended to put former employee"into as good a 
position pecuniarily as he would have been had the 
contract been performed"). Absent the breach, and 
consistent with the District Court's findings, Scully would 
have obtained 850,000 shares of US WA TS stock at $0.75 
per share by risking a total of $637,500 ($0.75 x 850,000 
shares). The District Court's damage calculation came close 
to achieving this result because it placed on US WATS the 
added risk, caused by its breach, of obtaining the same 
number of shares on the open market, the only r emaining 
source for the shares. The Court did so by taking the 
$0.625 difference between the $1.375 market price for 
unrestricted shares and Scully's $0.75 exercise price to 
obtain restricted shares, and multiplying that difference by 
850,000 shares for an award of $531,250. 
 
US WATS protests, on several gr ounds, the District 
Court's failure to apply a 30% discount to the $1.375 
market price of unrestricted stock. First, we r eject US 
WATS's contention that the District Court was necessarily 
obligated to apply the 30% discount to the $1.375 share 
price of unrestricted stock on January 23, 1997 in order to 
account for the lower value of the restricted stock. There is 
some validity to the point that the hypothetical value of 
similarly restricted US WATS stock selling on the open 
market would have been lower than the value of the non- 
restricted stock in order to account for the decreased 
marketability. See Sowell v. Butcher & Singer , Inc., 926 F.2d 
289, 300 (3d Cir. 1991) (an unregister ed stock's lack of 
transferability "will have an impact on its value"); see also 
Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp. , 839 F.2d 407, 412-13 
(8th Cir. 1998) (recounting evidence that decreased 
marketability reduces unregistered stock's market value); 
Eastern Serv. Corp. v. Comm'r of Inter nal Revenue, 650 F.2d 
379, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining that r estricted 
securities are subject to a discount to objectively determine 
hypothetical fair market value if they were traded on an 
open market); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 891, 
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894-95 (3d Cir. 1975) (remanding for evidentiary 
proceedings to determine proper discount to apply to 
restricted stock). 
 
Nonetheless, we find no fault in the District Court's 
decision not to apply the 30% discount. If the District Court 
had applied the discount to all 850,000 shar es, as of the 
date of breach, it would have calculated Scully's damages 
using the intrinsic value of his option, resulting in a 
$180,625 award.4 This clearly would have undervalued 
Scully's loss because intrinsic value, which does not 
account for an option's reduced risk of loss and increased 
likelihood of profit, generally understates an option's true 
value. Although the District Court's damage calculation 
disregards the restricted period applicable to Scully's 
shares by omitting the discount, we think the Court's 
approach was warranted. Therefore, we agree with the 
District Court's determination that application of a discount 
was not necessarily a reasonable method of calculating 
damages. See Palomar, 982 F. Supp. at 212 (refusing to 
limit plaintiff 's damages on a cover theory because covering 
would have added to plaintiff 's risk). 
 
Second, we reject US WATS's contention that Scully was 
not entitled to any damages beyond that computed using 
the discount unless he actually covered by entering the 
market to mitigate his losses. At oral argument, US WATS 
posited that it would have been enough for Scully to risk 
only the $637,500 that he would have had to pay pursuant 
to his option. We disagree with this ar gument for two 
reasons. 
 
As an initial matter, the cover/mitigation principle does 
not actually require plaintiffs to enter the market. Schultz, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The $180,625 figure is computed by applying the 30% discount to the 
$1.375 market price of US WATS unr estricted stock on January 23, 
1997. The result, $0.9625 ($1.375 x 30%), would represent the 
hypothetical market value of US WATS stock having the same one year 
holding restriction applicable to Scully's option. The difference between 
that market value and Scully's exercise price for the same stock results 
in the option's intrinsic value of $0.2125 ($0.9625 - $0.75), which leads 
to a total intrinsic value damage award of $180,625 for all 850,000 
shares ($0.2125 x 850,000 shares). 
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716 F.2d at 140. It is merely a method of establishing "the 
outer time limit of a reasonable period during which the 
highest intermediate value of the lost stock[can] be 
ascertained. . . . [B]ut the injured party is not actually 
required to reenter the market in or der to determine when 
he might have done so." Id. Further , requiring actual 
reentry would improperly increase the risk to which a 
plaintiff was exposed since such a rule would not account 
for possibly unfavorable market conditions, which"would 
frustrate the rule which seeks to make an investor whole." 
Id. 
 
Moreover, US WATS ignor es that its suggested approach 
would necessarily deprive Scully of some part of the 
advantage, either the decreased risk or the potential profit, 
that he held pursuant to his option. If, after US W ATS 
refused to deliver the shares, Scully had chosen to obtain 
the full 850,000 shares, he would have had to risk much 
more money than he would have risked in exer cising his 
option, specifically $1,168,750 ($1.375 x 850,000 shares) 
as compared to the $637,500 he had to risk under his 
option for the same number of shares. Thus, he would have 
been risking an additional $531,250 ($1,168,750 - 
$637,500), in an attempt to preserve his ability to obtain 
the same potential profit. Similarly, if he had chosen to 
equalize his risk by spending only $637,500 on the open 
market, he would have obtained less than 850,000 shares 
because the purchase price would have been $1.375 rather 
than $0.75 per share. Thus, he would have been at a 
disadvantage in terms of potential profit since that profit 
would have been for less than the full 850,000 shar es to 
which he had a right under the option. 
 
The District Court rejected Scully's damage computation 
and US WATS's discount approach because "they did not 
reflect the realities of the situation." Scully, 1999 WL 
553474, at *5. Numerous decisions have agr eed with the 
principle that damage calculations should reflect economic 
reality. See Palomar, 982 F. Supp. at 210 (rejecting damage 
computation in stock case as "unrealistic"); Electrospace, 
269 N.E.2d at 27 (reaching damage award in stock case by 
"[l]ooking to the economic realities and eschewing legalisms 
or verbalisms"). Accordingly, we agr ee with the District 
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Court's decision to ignore the restricted period, to refuse to 
apply the discount, and to award Scully damages for his 
lost opportunity. 
 
Undoubtedly, the District Court's damage calculation was 
to some extent imprecise. But so were the calculations that 
Scully and US WATS advocated. Importantly, we are 
satisfied that, in the circumstances pr esented, the District 
Court's damage calculation with respect to the stock option 
adequately puts Scully in a position most closely r eflecting 
the one he would have occupied absent US WA TS's breach. 
"[T]he law does not command mathematical pr eciseness 
from the evidence in finding damages." Rochez, 527 F.2d at 
895. Instead, all that is required is that"sufficient facts . . . 
be introduced so that a court can arrive at an intelligent 
estimate without speculation or conjecture." Id.; accord 
Indu Craft, 47 F.3d at 496 (damages for breach of contract 
need only be proved with "reasonable certainty"). 
 
       In assessing damages, particularly for lost pr ofits, we 
       recognize the inevitability of some impr ecision in the 
       proof, and note that certainty as to the amount of 
       damages is not required, particularly when it is the 
       defendant's breach that has made such impr ecision 
       unavoidable. 
 
Palomar, 982 F. Supp. at 208. 
 
V. 
 
We now turn to the issue of individual liability. The 
District Court found that Parker and Brown wer e 
individually liable based on alternate theories of "alter ego" 
responsibility and civil conspiracy. As we explain below in 
separately addressing each theory, we believe that neither 
one was properly invoked. 
 
A. 
 
US WATS asserts that imposing liability on "alter ego" 
grounds is legal error because plaintif fs never raised that 
theory at trial. We agree. This Court has stated that "[t]he 
fundamental proposition which probably no one would 
dispute is that a court's power is judicial only, not 
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administrative nor investigative. A judgment may only be 
properly given for something raised in the course of a 
litigation between the parties." Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. 
Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316, 318 (3d Cir . 1944); see also 
Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 265-66, 268-69 (1891). 
This right derives not only from the pr oper role of an Article 
III court but also from due process pr otections. "The core of 
due process is the right to notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard." LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 
262, 266 (1997); accord Reynolds, 140 U.S. at 268-69. 
 
A review of the complaint shows that plaintif fs never 
raised an alter ego liability theory in the initial pleadings or 
at any point during pretrial proceedings. The trial 
transcript indicates only one instance where the issue is 
raised, a mere inference where the District Court asked 
whether US WATS abided by corporate for malities. In its 
opinion, the Court predicated alter ego liability only on its 
finding that US WATS did not observe corporate formalities. 
It is apparent from the recor d that plaintiffs did not 
properly present this issue to the Court, and thus US 
WATS had no opportunity to present a defense. Thus, the 
District Court's alter ego ruling cannot stand. 
 
B. 
 
By contrast, Scully pleaded the civil conspiracy theory in 
his complaint and therefore US WA TS, Parker, and Brown 
were on notice of the claim. Under Pennsylvania law, a 
plaintiff must show that " `two or more persons combined or 
agreed with intent to do an unlawful act or to do an 
otherwise lawful act by unlawful means.' " Doe v. Kohn, 
Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(quoting Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 
472 (Pa. 1979)). This showing "may be proved by acts and 
circumstances sufficient to warrant an infer ence that the 
unlawful combination had been in point of fact for med for 
the purpose charged. While conspiracy may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence, the evidence must be full, clear 
and satisfactory. . . . Mere suspicion or the possibility of 
guilty connection is not sufficient, nor pr oof of acts which 
are equally consistent with innocence." Fife v. Great Atl. & 
Pac. Tea Co., 52 A.2d 24, 27 (Pa. 1947) (citations omitted). 
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Under this standard, the record does not support a 
finding of civil conspiracy. The District Court stated as its 
basis for civil conspiracy liability that "it is clear that 
[Parker and Brown] conspired to cheat the plaintiff of the 
fruits of his employment and the `turnar ound' success he 
had achieved for them." Scully, 1999 WL 553474, at *2. 
While a review of the record shows support for the 
proposition that Brown was indeed inter ested in ousting 
Scully for devious reasons, neither the District Court, the 
parties, nor our own review of the recor d have revealed any 
evidence proving that Parker agreed to wr ongfully terminate 
Scully's employment in order to avoid the exer cise of his 
stock option. For instance, Parker testified that the decision 
to terminate Scully had been made befor e Parker was 
informed of it. This indirect involvement is reinforced by 
evidence that Parker's last day of work was two weeks 
before Scully's termination. At that point, Parker had 
vacated his office and was preparing to withdraw entirely 
from the business. The absence of evidence that Parker 
participated in a plot to terminate Scully pr ecludes our 
finding the active involvement or collaboration of at least 
two people. Therefore, we will reverse the holding of civil 
conspiracy. 
 
VI. 
 
Scully next appeals the District Court's ruling that US 
WATS did not violate Pennsylvania's WPCL when it refused 
to allow him to exercise his stock option after his 
termination. Legal interpretations of the WPCL constitute 
questions of law subject to our plenary review. Cf. Voest- 
Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.2d 
206, 211 (3d Cir. 1990). Scully invokes the WPCL in an 
effort to obtain the attorney's fees and liquidated damages 
that Pennsylvania law authorizes. See 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
SS 260.9a(f), 260.10 (1992). 
 
The District Court determined that US W ATS had not 
violated the WPCL because the stock option mer ely 
constituted potential future, not earned, compensation. In 
other words, the District Court analogized the stock option 
to salary -- just as Scully would have no WPCL claim for 
unearned salary payments that post-dated his termination, 
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the District Court reasoned that he had no WPCL claim in 
exercising the stock option after the date of his discharge. 
We agree with the general proposition that the WPCL does 
not give rise to claims for unearned compensation. 
Numerous decisions have held that the WPCL does not 
create a new right to compensation, but rather , merely 
establishes a right to enforce payment of wages and 
compensation that the employer has legally obligated itself 
to pay. See, e.g., Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 801 
(3d Cir. 1990); Harding v. Duquesne Light Co., 882 F. Supp. 
422, 427-28 (W.D. Pa. 1995); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 
P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Sendi v. 
NCR Comten, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1577, 1579 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
We differ with the District Court in that, based on its 
factual findings, we believe Scully's stock option constituted 
earned compensation. 
 
The WPCL provides a statutory remedy to employees 
whose former employers fail to timely pay ear ned 
compensation. The WPCL states in relevant part: 
 
       [w]henever an employer separates an employe[e] from 
       the payroll . . . the wages or compensation earned shall 
       become due and payable not later than the next 
       regular payday of his employer on which such wages 
       would otherwise be due and payable. 
 
43 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 260.5(a) (1992) (emphasis added). 
 
As an initial matter, we are confident that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude that the stock 
option granted to Scully, essentially a call option, 
constitutes "wages or compensation" within the meaning of 
the WPCL. The WPCL defines wages as including: 
 
       all earnings of an employe[e], r egardless of whether 
       determined on time, task, piece, commission or other 
       method of calculation. The term "wages" also includes 
       fringe benefits or wage supplements whether payable 
       by the employer from his funds or from amounts 
       withheld from the employe[e]s' pay by the employer. 
 
43 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 260.2a (1992) (emphasis added). In 
turn, "fringe benefits or wage supplements" are defined as 
including: 
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       all monetary employer payments to provide benefits 
       under any employe[e] benefit plan, as defined in 
       section 3(3) of [ERISA], as well as separation, vacation, 
       holiday, or guaranteed pay; reimbursement for 
       expenses; union dues withheld from the employe[e]s' 
       pay by the employer; and any other amount to be paid 
       pursuant to an agreement to the employe[e], a third 
       party or fund for the benefit of employe[e]s. 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted). The 
"call" option extended to Scully falls within the definition of 
fringe benefits or wage supplements because it r epresents 
an "amount to be paid pursuant to an agreement to the 
employee."5 See Regier v. R 
              hone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. Civ. 
A. 93-4821, 1995 WL 395948, at *4-7 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 
1005) (WPCL covers call options); Bowers v. NETI Techs., 
Inc., 690 F. Supp. 349, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (employer's 
agreement to repurchase stock fr om employee subject to 
the WPCL). 
 
Concerning the more central issue, a stock option may 
qualify as earned compensation under the WPCL if the 
employer specifically agreed to deliver the option as 
employment compensation. See Keck v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 
No. Civ. A. 96-3016, 1996 WL 665536, *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 
12, 1996); Harding, 882 F. Supp. at 427-29. Scully 
presents exactly this situation. Stock options provide an 
incentive to an employee to work to increase the stock's 
value and thereby benefit the company. See Safeway 
Stores, 210 F.3d at 1243. The company benefits because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although the District Court assumed that the WPCL covered the stock 
option, the Court initially opined that the stock option was likely not 
subject to WPCL protection because the statutory definition of "wages" 
requires that they be payable by cash and check, "a requirement that 
cannot very well be applied to stock-options." Scully, 1999 WL 553474, 
at *3 (relying upon 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 260.3(a)). It is true that the 
WPCL 
requires that "[w]ages other than fringe benefits and wage supplements" 
be payable "in lawful money of the United States or check." 43 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. S 260.3(a) (1992). However, the second subsection of the same 
statute, which applies to "[f]ringe benefits or wage supplements," 
contains no such restriction, instead r equiring merely that employers 
must pay such compensation within specified time frames. See 43 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. S 260.3(b) (1992). 
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the stock option lowers the amount of up-front 
compensation costs that must be paid directly to the 
employee, but the employee bears a considerable risk since 
his compensation will not increase unless the stock value 
increases. See id. Thus, stock options are often termed 
"contingent compensation." Id. (inter nal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
 
Scully and US WATS entered into this precise 
arrangement. As the District Court noted, "[t]he entire 
thrust of the overall arrangement between plaintif f and the 
defendants was that plaintiff 's ef forts in improving the 
fortunes of the company would be rewarded on the basis of 
the company's improved condition as of a year after the 
exercise of the option." Scully v. US W ATS, Inc., No. CIV. A. 
97-4051, 1999 WL 592695, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1999). 
 
       [I]t is quite apparent that plaintif f 's whole purpose in 
       entering into these arrangements was the expectation 
       that, as a result of his efforts, the company would 
       experience a big improvement in its fortunes, and 
       plaintiff would share in that prosperity. Defendants 
       wrongfully deprived plaintiff of that opportunity, and 
       should not be permitted to insist that plaintiff 's 
       chance for future profit ended as of January 23, 1997 
       . . . . 
 
Scully, 1999 WL 553474, at *5. 
 
Under these circumstances, we think it clear that, once 
Scully entered into the two-year oral employment contract, 
he needed to do no more to bind US WA TS to the stock 
option. Scully's stock option was thus "ear ned within the 
meaning of the WPCL because [he] was not r equired to 
render any further services before they vested and became 
exercisable." Regier, 1995 WL 395948, at *8. 
 
In this matter, we conclude that US W ATS violated the 
WPCL when it discharged Scully while r efusing to honor his 
attempted exercise of his stock option. Because Scully 
established that US WATS violated the WPCL, the District 
Court should have awarded him attorney's fees. See 43 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. S 260.9a(f) (1992) (court "shall, in addition to any 
judgment awarded to the plaintiff . . . allow costs for 
reasonable attorneys' fees of any natur e to be paid by the 
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defendant") (emphasis added). We ther efore remand to allow 
the District Court to address the proper amount of those 
fees. 
 
In addition to attorney's fees, Scully seeks liquidated 
damages also available under the WPCL. The Act entitles 
plaintiffs to liquidated damages only when there is "no good 
faith contest or dispute of any wage claim." 43 Pa. Ann. 
Stat. S 260.10 (1992). As the District Court has not 
addressed the liquidated damages issue, we will remand for 
a specific finding on this question. 
 
VII. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court will affirm the 
District Court's order in part, reverse in part, and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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